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THE ANATOMY OF AN HISTORIC DECISION:
NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN
SAMUEL R.

PIERCE, JR.*

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' is a landmark decision in the
law of libel and in the field of civil liberties because the United
States Supreme Court, for the first time, determined "the
extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press
limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought
by a public official against critics of his official conduct." 2 In
unanimously reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama, the Court held that the first and fourteenth amendments to
the Constitution prohibit "a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not." 4 Justices Black, Goldberg, and
Douglas concurred with the result reached, but in the concurring
opinions of Black and Goldberg-both of whom were joined by
Douglas-they contend that the Constitution affords greater pro* Member of the New York Bar.
1376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2

Id. at 256.
'The first amendment reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of

speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
The section of the fourteenth amendment applicable to this case provides:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Since 1925 the guarantees in the first amendment have been applied to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus,
the states are under federal judicial discipline in the matter of these rights.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
'376 U.S. at 279-80.
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tection to persons exercising the right of public criticism than the
standard adopted by the Court.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion, took the position that the Constitution affords to citizens and the press "an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite
the harm which may flow from excesses and abuses."' In short,
he disagreed with the test of "actual malice" contained in the rule
adopted by the Court.
The position taken by Mr. Justice Black is close to that of Mr.
Justice Goldberg. He expressed the opinions that the first amendment to the Constitution, at the very least,0 gives people and the
press an unconditional right "to criticize [public] officials and discuss public affairs with impunity ' 7 and that the rule adopted by the
Court requiring such criticism and discussion to be without malice
is not sufficient.
The views of the concurring members of the Court raise the
fundamental question of whether the rule adopted by the Court is
adequate. It shall be the purpose of this article to analyze carefully
the Sullivan case and to discuss the adequacy of the criterion
adopted by the Supreme Court, as well as other questions raised or
suggested by the case, with the objective of appraising and evaluating the case's significance.

I. THE CASE
A. PrecipitatingEvents
For over a century Negroes in the United States have been
struggling for human dignity and full citizenship. Their efforts to
attain these objectives have been met with constant resistance
by opponents who seek to perpetuate racial segregation and discrimination.' The resistance techniques used against Negroes have
been many and varied. They have ranged from such crude or
obvious means as violence and intimidation, Black Codes, and Jim
Id. at 293.
Mr. Justice Black would probably support a rule giving greater protection
to free speech and press than the one set forth in his concurring opinion. See
Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U.L. REv. 549 (1962); cf. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is Absolute, 1961 SuPREmE CouRT Rv. 245.
7376 U.S. at 296.
"KING, SRmIDE TowARD FREEDOM

154-58 (1958).
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Crow laws' to the more subtle methods of token desegregation and
the gerrymandering of election districts.'"
In recent years, however, substantial gains have been made in
the Negro's struggle for human dignity. The United States Supreme
Court, through its decisions affecting civil rights, has played a major
role in giving impetus to the recent progress of the Negro. Time
and time again the Court has struck down, as being in violation
of the Constitution, methods and techniques devised to perpetuate
practices of racial segregation and discrimination." In addition,
during the past decade, there has been a growing self respect which
has "inspired the Negro with a new determination to struggle and
sacrifice until first class citizenship becomes a reality"; and there
has been "an awakening moral consciousness on the part of millions
of white Americans concerning segregation" which has also helped
to move the Negro more rapidly toward his goal.' 2
The greatest opposition to the Negro's advancement is in the
Deep South; and nowhere, with the possible exception of Mississippi, has that opposition been more fierce and tenacious than Alabama. The opponents to civil rights in that state, for example, have
bombed religious institutions and private homes,'1 3 whipped up
hysterical mobs, attempted to suppress the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People,'4 and threatened to close
down a public school. 5
On February 29, 1960, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a national
""Jim Crow laws" is a colloquial, generic term used to refer to any laws
which have as their purpose discrimination against or segregation of
Negroes. Immediately following the Civil War a number of state legislatures
passed laws defining the status of ex-slaves. These laws, which were called
"Black Codes," replaced the chains of slavery with peonage so as to make
Negroes an inferior and subordinate economic caste. See DuBois, BLACK
REcoNsTRucTiox 381-525 (1935); FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM
299 (1956); KONVITZ & LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTs 15 (1961).
1' See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Bush v. School
Bd., 308 F.2d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 1962).
"1Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (education); Bush v.
School Bd., 364 U.S. 500 (1960) (education); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (education); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(housing); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (voting).
1 KING, op. cit. supra note 8, at 154.
1" Record, vol. 4, pp. 1549-55, 1557, 1618-19, New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
" Record, vol. 4, pp. 1413-15, 1556-63, 1565-67 (mob hysteria). See
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (attempted suppression of
NAACP activities).
" Record, vol. 4, p. 1586.
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civil rights leader, was arrested on an indictment charging two
counts of perjury in connection with the filing of his Alabama
State Income Tax Return, a felony carrying a maximum penalty
of ten years imprisonment upon conviction."0 Many believed that
this arrest was without merit and was made because of Dr. Iing's
civil rights activities in Alabama.1 A "Committee to Defend Martin
Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South" was
formed, and on March 29, 1960, it published the advertisement in
The New York Times which gave rise to the case under discussion."'
The advertisement, which consisted of a full page, was entitled
"Heed Their Rising Voices."' The first paragraph stated that
thousands of Southern Negro students "are engaged in wide spread
non-violent demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right to
live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and
the Bill of Rights" and the efforts of those students to uphold those
guarantees "are being met by an unprecedented wave of terror."
The second paragraph told of how 400 students were forcibly
ejected, tear-gassed, soaked to the skin in freezing weather with
fire hoses, arrested en masse, and otherwise mistreated when they
tried to integrate lunch counters in Orangeburg, South Carolina.
The third paragraph spoke of Montgomery, Alabama, and complained that after students sang "My Country 'Tis of Thee" on
the State Capitol steps their leaders were expelled from school,
and truckloads of armed policemen ringed the Alabama State College Campus; and that when the student body protested to state
authorities, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve
them into submission.
The fourth paragraph praised young American teenagers in
" Id., vol. 5, pp. 1934-37.
" Dr. King was acquitted of both counts of the indictment. See id., vol. 2,
p. 680.
"N.Y. Times, March 29, 1960, p. 25, col. 1-8. A copy of the advertisement is attached as an appendix to the Supreme Court's opinion. 376 U.S. at
292.
" This phrase was taken from a New York Times editorial of March 19,
1960, which read in part as follows: "The growing movement of peaceful
mass demonstrations by Negroes is something new in the South, something
understandable ....

Let Congress heed their rising voices, for they will be

heard." N.Y. Times, March 19, 1960, p. 20, col. 1. The entire ad appears in
the Record, vol. 5, p. 1925.
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Southern cities for taking part in demonstrations, referring to them
as "protagonists of democracy."
The fifth paragraph was rather long, but it essentially lauded
Dr. King for his great leadership in the Negro's non-violent struggle
for civil rights, and asserted that the "Southern violators of the Constitution" are determined to destroy him, since he "more than any
other, symbolizes the new spirit now sweeping the South." It stated
also that the Southern Christian Leadership Conference which Dr.
King had founded was "spearheading the surging right-to-vote
movement."
The sixth paragraph alleged what the so-called "Southern violators" had done to Dr. King and explained why. It stated that the
"Southern violators" had repeatedly "answered Dr. King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence" by bombing his home,
assaulting his person and arresting him seven times for various
offenses. The paragraph went on to state that "they" have now
charged him with the serious crime of perjury and that this was
done to remove him physically as the leader to whom millions look
for guidance and thereby to "demoralize Negro Americans and
weaken their will to struggle."
The remaining four paragraphs essentially constituted a request for funds. The last of these paragraphs concluded with the
following plea:
We urge you to join hands with our fellow Americans in
the South by supporting, with your dollars, this Combined Appeal for all three needs-the defense of Martin Luther Kingthe support of the embattled students-and the struggle for the
right-to-vote.
The names of "The Committee to Defend Martin Luther King
and the Struggle for Freedom in the South" appeared directly below
the appeal. The committee included a host of prominent personalities such as A. Philip Randolph, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Dr.
Algernon Black, Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, Marlon Brando,
and Langston Hughes.
Below the names of the committee members were the following
words: "We, in the south who are struggling daily for dignity and
freedom warmly endorse this appeal"; and under those words were
listed a number of persons, practically all of whom were ministers,
who lived in the South. Four of these individuals, the Reverends

320
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Ralph D. Abernathy, Fred L. Shuttlesworth, S. S. Seay, Sr., and
J. E. Lowery were residents of Alabama and subsequently were
named as defendants in this litigation.
The circumstances under which this advertisement was published
are significant. John Murray, a writer who had participated in the
composition of the ad, delivered it to Gershon Aaronson, a member
of the national advertising staff of the Times specializing in "editorial type" advertising.2
The copy delivered to Aaronson was
accompanied by a letter from A. Philip Randolph, chairman of the
committee, which read:
This will certify that the names included on the enclosed
list are all signed members of the Committee to Defend Martin
Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South.
Please be assured that they have all given us permission to
2
use their names in furthering the work of our Committee. 1
The copy as submitted to Aaronson, however, did not contain
the statement, "we in the south ... warmly endorse this appeal," or
any of the names printed under it. Those names were added to a
revision of the proof at the suggestion of Bayard Rustin, the director of the committee. Rustin told Murray that it was unnecessary to obtain the consent of the individuals involved since they
were all members of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
and, as the SCLC supported the work of the committee, there was
22
no need to consult them.
The original copy Murray delivered to Aaronson was sent to
D. Vincent Redding, manager of the advertising acceptability department of The New York Times, which department is responsible
for screening advertisements. 2 Redding read the copy and approved it for publication. 24 He gave his approval because he knew
nothing to cause him to believe that anything in the proposed text
was false and because it bore the endorsement of a number of
people who were well known and whose reputations he had no reason
to question. 5 Consequently, he did not think it was necessary to
oId., vol. 2, pp. 731, 738, 805.
"Id., vol. 5, p. 1992.
"Id., vol. 2, pp. 806-09.
"Id. at 733-34.
2"Id. at 758.
"5Id. at 758, 759-60, 762-63.
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make any further check on the accuracy of the statements contained
in the copy.2 6
The New York Times was paid slightly more than 4,800 dollars
for the publication of the advertisement.27 The total circulation of
the issue containing the ad was approximately 650,000, of which
about 394 copies were mailed to Alabama subscribers or shipped to
newsdealers in the state. Of the copies that were sent into the state,
about 35 went into Montgomery County.2"
The publication resulted in a storm of protest in Alabama.
Soon after the advertisement was published, libel suits were instituted by the three incumbent City Commissioners of Montgomery,
by a former City Commissioner, and by the then Governor of Alabama, demanding millions in damages.2" One of the incumbent
Commissioners who brought suit was L. B. Sullivan, who had been
Commissioner of Public Affairs since October 5, 1959, and whose
specific duties were to supervise the Police Department, Fire Department, Department of Cemetery, and Department of Scales."
On April 8, 1960, prior to bringing suit against the Times
and the Reverends Ralph D. Abernathy, Fred L. Shuttlesworth,
S. S. Seay, Sr., and J. E. Lowery-the ministers residing in Alabama whose names appeared in the ad-Sullivan wrote each of
them a letter demanding a retraction."' The letters were in identical
terms. In each of them Sullivan set forth the passages of the advertisement complained of. 32 He then stated that the "foregoing
matter, and the publication as a whole" charged him with "grave
20 Id. at 765, 771.
Id. at 752.
'8 Id. at 601-02; id., vol. 5, pp. 1942-43.
See id., vol. 5, pp. 1999-2243; id., vol. 2, pp. 871-89. See also Parks v.
New York Times Co., 195 F. Supp. 919, 921 (M.D. Ala. 1961), rev'd, 308
F.2d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 1962). The writer was informed by Mr. Louis Loeb,
a member of the firm of Lord, Day & Lord, general counsel for the Times,
that after the Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan, all of the other libel
suits based on the advertisement were dismissed.
'0Record, vol. 2, p. 703.
31Id. at 588, 671, 776; id., vol. 5, pp. 1949, 1962-68. The letters sent by
Sullivan were erroneously dated "March 8, 1960." They should have been
dated April 8, 1960. It should be noted that Alabama law prohibits a public
officer from recovering punitive damages in a libel suit unless he first makes
a written demand for a public retraction and the defendant fails or refuses
to comply. Therefore, Sullivan had to send out these letters in order to be
able to recover punitive damages for the alleged defamation. See AlA. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, § 914 (1958).
" The passages complained of were the third and sixth paragraphs of
the advertisement.
-"
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misconduct and of improper actions and omissions as an official
of the City of Montgomery" and called on the addressee to "publish
in as prominent and as public a manner as the foregoing false and
83
'
defamatory material .... a full and fair retraction.
The Times turned Sullivan's letter over to its general counsel
for response. In a letter to Sullivan dated April 15, 1960, Lord,
Day & Lord, attorneys for the Times, stated in part:
We have been investigating the matter and are somewhat
puzzled as to how you think the statements in any way reflect on
you. So far, our investigation would seem to indicate that the
statements are substantially correct with the sole exception that
we find no justification for the statement that the dining hall in the
State College was "padlocked in an attempt to starve them into
submission."
In the meanwhile you might, if you desire, let us know in what
respect you
claim that the statements in the advertisement reflect
4
on you.

On April 19, 1960, without answering this letter, Sullivan commenced a libel suit for 500,000 dollars in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County against The New York Times and the four ministers, none of whom had responded to Sullivan's letter of April 8.81
At the time the suit was instituted, The New York Times Company, which is a New York corporation, was not qualified to do
business in Alabama, had not designated anyone to accept service
of process there, 6 and did a negligible amount of business there.8 7
Under these circumstances, the plaintiff relied on sections 188 and
and 199(1) of title 7 of the Alabama Code to effect service upon
the Times. Section 188 provides that service against a corporation
may be executed by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint upon several types of officers or employees of a corporation
" See Record, vol. 2, pp. 588-89.
" Id. at 589-90; id., vol. 5, p. 1971. Subsequently, on May 9, 1960, Governor John Patterson of Alabama sent a demand for a retraction to the Times
similar to the one Sullivan had sent. The Governor's letter asserted that the
publication charged him "with grave misconduct and of improper actions
and omissions as Governor of Alabama and Ex-Officio Chairman." The Times
did print a retraction. Id., vol. 2, p. 773; id., vol. 5, pp. 1958, 1998. This
retraction later became of some significance in the litigation. See text accompanying note 98 infra; cf. 376 U.S. at 286-87.
" Record, vol. 1, pp. 1-2.
"Id. at 134-35.
",See generally id. at 330-408, 437-62.
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including "any . . .agent thereof." 3s Pursuant to this section, the
plaintiff served Don McKee, a "stringer" for The New York Times
in Montgomery, claiming him to be an agent under section 188.
In addition, the plaintiff served the Secretary of State under section
199(1), the so-called "long arm" statute of the state.3 9

B. Claims and Defenses on Trial and Appeal
In the early stages of the litigation, a very substantial amount
of time was spent on a motion to dismiss brought by The New
York Times.40 Prior to answering the complaint, the Times appeared "specially" and moved to dismiss the action against it on the
ground that the Circuit Court of Montgomery County did not have
jurisdiction over the Times or over the subject matter of the action.4 The newspaper's attorneys argued that it was a nonresident
corporation which was not doing business in the state and that the
alleged cause of action had not arisen out of any business conducted
by the Times in Alabama.4 2 They contended that title 7, section
199(1) of the Alabama Code of 1940 was not applicable to this
situation and that if the court assumed jurisdiction it would "deny"
to their client "due process of law in contravention of" the first,
fifth, and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. 3
Judge Walter B. Jones denied the motion on the ground that the
Times had made a general appearance in the action even though its
motion papers had stated that it was making a special appearance.
In support of his decision, the judge pointed out that one of the
prayers in the motion requested the court to "dismiss this action
as to The New York Times Company ... for lack of jurisdiction
of the subject matter of said action." 4 He said that this clearly
went beyond the question of jurisdiction of the court over the person
" ALA. COD ANN. tit. 7, § 188 (1958).
" This section, at the time of the present suit, provided in essence that
any nonresident who had not qualified to do business in the state would, by
doing any business, work, or service there, be deemed to have appointed the
Secretary of State to be his lawful agent, upon whom process could be served
in any action arising out of or incidental to that nonresident's doing business
or performing work or services in Alabama. Ala. Acts 1953, No. 282, at 347.
toThe court spent three days hearing this motion-July 25-27, 1960.
Roughly the same amount of time was spent on the trial of the case on the
merits. See Record, vol. 1, p. 130; id., vol. 2, p. 567.
,Id., vol. 1, pp. 39-46.
,See note 39 supra.
"Record, vol. 1, pp. 43-44.
"Id. at 49.
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of the defendant and constituted a general appearance in the case.
He stated the defendant could not assert that it was not properly
before the court and "in the same breath argue" that if it was, "this
Court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action."
The judge further stated that "a party's appearance in a suit for any
purpose other than to contest the Court's jurisdiction over the per45
son of such party, is a general appearance."
After holding that the Times had made a general appearance
in the case and had thus waived its special appearance, Judge Jones
went on by way of elaborate dictum to explain why he considered that
the Times was "amenable to process and suit in the Alabama courts
regardless of its general appearance." 4 In reaching this conclusion, he brushed aside the Times' contention that section 199 (1)
of the Alabama Code did not apply to it since the cause of action did
not arise out of business it conducted in Alabama. He said that
where a corporation is doing business in the state, due process does
not require the cause of action to arise out of business done there.
He then went on to find that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the conclusion that The New York Times was doing business
in Alabama.
The trial on the merits of the case was relatively short. It
commenced on November 1, 1960, and was over on November 3.47
The conditions under which the trial took place are worthy of comment.
The atmosphere was one of hostility toward the defendants.
For some time prior to the trial, the Montgomery press had continuously denounced the defendants and the advertisement that had
been published in the Times.48 For example, an article entitled "The
Abolitionist Hellmouths," which appeared in The Montgomery Advertiser on April 17, 1960, started off by stating: "The Commonwealth of Alabama with its three million people has been painfully
'40
and savagefully injured by The New York Times.
Press photographers took pictures in the courtroom
of the
0
jurors for local newspapers," and television cameras followed the
"'Id. at 49-50. See Blankenship v. Blankenship, 263 Ala. 297, 303, 82
So. 2d 335, 340 (1955).
"Record, vol. 1, p. 51.
"Id.,
vol. 2, p. 567.
8
1d.,
I vol. 5, pp. 1999-2077.
"9Id. at 2013.
" Id., vol. 2, pp. 951, 955.
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jury to the very door of the juryroom. 1 Two Montgomery newspapers, one on its front page, carried the names of the jurors."
Judge Jones presided over the trial. Much of his philosophy
about segregation and some of his thoughts about how the Constitution should be interpreted were reflected in a statement he made
from the bench in a companion case. In a libel action arising out of
the same set of facts as the Sullivan case and against the same defendants, Judge Jones stated in open court:
From this hour forward, in keeping with the common law of
Alabama, and observing the wise, time honored customs and
usages of our people, both white and black, . . .there will be no
integrated seating in this courtroom. Spectators will be seated in
this courtroom according to their race, and this for the orderly
administration of justice and the good of all people coming here
lawfully.
Much has been said at the Bar, and out of the hearing of the
trial jury, as to the supposed requirements of the XIV Amendment directing the Trial Judge of the Court of a sovereign state
how he will conduct a trial before a jury in the courts of Alabama.
I would like to say for those here present, and for those who
may come here to litigate in the future, that the XIV Amendment has no standing whatever in this Court, it is a pariah and an
outcast, if it be construed to hold and direct the Presiding Judge of
this Court as to the manner in which proceedings in the Court....
shall be conducted....
The judge presiding here today knows that it is quite the
fashion in high judicial place to work the XIV Amendment
overtime, to put it above every other part of the Constitution, and
to deliberately forget and neglect the more important parts of the
federal constitution....
We will now continue with the trial of this case under the laws
of the State of Alabama, and not under the XIV Amendment, and
in the belief and knowledge that the white man's justice, . . . will
give the parties at the Bar of this Court, regardless of race or
color, equal justice under law. 3
" Id. at 889-90; id., vol. 5, p. 2242.
" Id.at 952, 2079-80.
" W. B. Jones, Court Room Segregation, 22 ALA. LAW. 190-92 (1961).
The ALABAMA LAWYER reprinted this statement, which was made from the
bench of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County on February 1, 1961, during the trial of a related libel action based on the March 29 advertisement
which Mayor Earl James of Montgomery had brought against The New York
Times Company and the Reverends Abernathy, Shuttlesworth, Seay, and
Lowery.
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It was against this background that the case went to trial on
the merits. The plaintiff claimed damages against defendants in the
sum of 500,000 dollars for maliciously publishing in the advertisement false and defamatory matter about him in his capacity as a
public official of the City of Montgomery."'
The specific subject matter which the plaintiff alleged damaged
his reputation was set forth in the complaint as follows:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang, 'My Country
'Tis of Thee' on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus.
When the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission.
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr.
King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They
have bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They have
assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven times-for
'speeding', 'loitering' and similar 'offenses'. And now they have
charged him with 'perjury'-a felony under which they could imprison him for ten years. 55
With respect to the first paragraph quoted above, which was in
fact the third paragraph of the advertisement, the plaintiff produced evidence to show that it contained inaccuracies. The first
half of the first sentence in the paragraph seemed to imply that
student leaders were expelled for singing on the Capitol steps. The
plaintiff showed that a succession of student demonstrations had
occurred in Montgomery, beginning with an unsuccessful effort by
some Alabama State College students to obtain service at a lunch
counter in the Montgomery County Court House. Subsequently,
on March 1, 1960, a thousand students marched from the college
campus to the State Capitol, and on the steps of the Capitol they
said the Lord's Prayer and sang the National Anthem. The following day, nine students, leaders of the lunch counter demonstration,
were expelled by the State Board of Education, but singing on the
Capitol steps was not the basis of the disciplinary action."
With regard to the remaining portion of the first sentence, the
plaintiff showed that "never at any time did the police 'ring' the
Record, vol. 1, pp. 2-5.
Id. at 2-3.
Id., vol. 2, pp. 593-94, 696-99; id., vol. 5, pp. 1972-74.
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campus although on three occasions they were deployed near the
campus in large numbers." 57
The plaintiff further demonstrated that the second sentence of
the paragraph in question was completely inaccurate. Alabama State
College students stayed away from classes on March 7, 1960, in a
sympathy strike for those who had been expelled on March 2, but
virtually all of them returned to class after a day;5" and there was
no foundation for the charge that the dining hall had been padlocked in an effort to starve the students into submission.59
It should be noted that except for the statement relating to the
police "ringing" the campus, the inaccuracies in the paragraph of
the advertisement under discussion concerned the State Department of Education, not the plaintiff's office of Commissioner of
Public Affairs.6" Consequently, the only inaccuracy which concerned
the plaintiff was the very subtle one involving the distinction in substance between police "ringing" the campus and police being "deployed near the campus in large numbers."
The plaintiff contended that the remaining paragraph of the
ad alluded to him because it described "police action."6 1 Except for
the fact that Dr. King had been arrested only four times instead of
seven as alleged in the ad, there were no inaccuracies in the facts
stated in this paragraph."2 However, the plaintiff took the position
that this paragraph could be read to accuse the police, and hence
the plaintiff, of bombing Dr. King's home, assaulting his person,
arresting him, and charging him with perjury. Therefore, the
plaintiff was allowed to present evidence to show that neither he
nor the police were responsible for any of these things.6 3
"'8Id., vol. 2, p. 594.
1d. at 593-94.
Id. at 594.
CO This fact was even

testified to by the plaintiff himself. On cross-examination he said that the statement about the dining halls being padlocked
related to a "responsibility of the State Department of Education" and that
"as far as the expulsion of the students is concerned that responsibility rests"
with the same Department. Id. at 716.
I'1 1d. at 724.
"Id. at 592, 594-95.
03 Id. at 707-12, 685-88. It should be noted that Dr. King's home was
bombed twice, but both occasions were before plaintiff's tenure in office (Id.
at 594, 685, 688); that Dr. King had been arrested four times and three of
these preceded the plaintiff's tenure (Id. at 592, 594-95, 703) ; and that Dr.
King did claim that he had been assaulted when he was arrested (Id. at 594),
although one of the officers who participated in the arrest denied it (Id. at
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The plaintiff and six other witnesses testified as to the impact
of the alleged defamatory statements upon his reputation. Sullivan
testified that he felt the advertisement reflected upon him, the
other Commissioners, and the community. 4 He thought that statements in the ad referring to "police activities" or "police action"
related to him, impugned his "ability and integrity," and reflected
on him "as an individual." 5
The six witnesses testified that they had associated all"0 or
portions 7 of the two paragraphs of the ad in question with the
plaintiff. None of the witnesses testified that they believed the statements contained in the advertisement, and five of the six testified
affirmatively that they did not believe any of such statements.08
The four ministers' principal line of defense was that they
simply had nothing at all to do with the advertisement. Each denied
any knowledge of the ad prior to its publication, any consent to the
use of his name in connection with it, and any responsibility for its
publication. 9 Their first notice of the Times ad (and only of the
language complained of) came from Sullivan's letters mailed to
them on April 8, 1960.70
The atmosphere of the courtroom as it related to the four Negro
defendants is of interest. Certain parts of the record will give the
reader some feeling of that atmosphere. For instance, at the very
outset of the trial when Judge Jones asked the prospective jurors
if any of them had any connection with the various lawyers who
would be trying the case, he referred to lawyers for the plaintiff and
The New York Times as "Mr." However, he noticeably dropped
the "Mr." when referring to the ministers' attorneys, who were
Negroes. He referred to them as "Fred Gray of Montgomery, Solomon Seay and V. Z. Crawford of Mobile."" Futhermore, throughout the record the Negro attorneys for the ministers were referred
to as "Lawyer Crawford, Lawyer Gray, and Lawyer Seay," while the
692-93). In any event, the assault incident also antedated Sullivan's tenure

as Commissioner. Id. at 694.

,Id. at 724.
Id. at 712, 713, 724. However, the plaintiff did not point to any sign
that he was held in less esteem because of the ad. See id. at 721-24.
Id. at 635-36, 645, 650, 663.
Id. at 605, 616, 618, 640.
"Id. at 623, 636, 638, 647, 651, 667.
69 Id. at 788-90, 792-94, 795, 797-98, 801-02.

"Id. at 789, 793, 798, 802.
11d.
I at 570.
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attorneys for the plaintiff and the Times were consistently called
"Mr. Nachman," "Mr. Embry," etc. Moreover, the record indicates
that on one occasion an attorney for the plaintiff mispronounced the
word "Negro" as "nigger."7 2 Finally, in summation, one of the
plaintiff's attorneys stated: "In other words, all of these things that
happened did not happen in Russia where the police run everything,
they did not happen in the Congo where they still eat them, they
73
happened in Montgomery, Alabama, a law abiding community.
Let us now turn to the defensive position taken by the Times.
It contended that the plaintiff had not sustained his burden of
proving that the advertisement complained of was published of or
concerning him. The newspaper also argued that the subject matter
was not defamatory of the plaintiff and did not charge him with any
misconduct in office. 74 For these reasons the Times believed the
plaintiff's complaint against it should be dismissed. Furthermore,
the Times took the position that even if the jury should find that
the alleged defamatory matter was published of and concerning the
plaintiff, the Times did not publish the ad maliciously and this should
result in the mitigation of damages against it.75
Judge Jones, in charging the jury,7 6 pointed out that a person
does not have to be specifically named in order to sustain a suit
for damages in a libel action. He said that where the libel is addressed to a class or group, any member of that group can sue on
the libel if he can prove that the words complained of were published
of or concerning him. He instructed the jury that the burden rested
upon the plaintiff to prove to their reasonable satisfaction that the
material in the ad complained of was published of and concerning
him. The court told the jury that if Sullivan sustained this burden,
the court was satisfied that the statements relied on by the plaintiff
were libelous per se. He stated that
Id. at 579. The pertinent part of the record reads:
Mr. Whitesell: . .. . The ad reads as follows: As the whole world
knows by now, thousands of Southern Negro studentsLawyer Crawford: Your Honor, we would like to object to the reading
of that ad unless the counsel who reads it will read what is said and as I
recall from reading that ad there is nothing on there that is spelled
N-i-g-g-e-r-s. It is spelled N-e-g-r-o and I am sure he is well aware of it.
Id. at 929-30. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 821, 829-36.
Id. at 844.
The charge appears in the Record, vol. 2, pp. 819-29.
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a publication is libelous per se when they [sic] are such as to
degrade the plaintiff in the estimation of his friends and the people
of the place where he lives, as to injure him in his public office,
or impute misconduct to him in office, or want of official integrity, or want of fidelity to a public trust or such as will subject
the plaintiff to ridicule or public distrust."
Judge Jones also stated in his charge that where a writing is
libelous per se "the law implies legal injury from the bare facts of
the publication itself"; that "falsity and malice are presumed";
that "general damages need not be alleged or proved, but are presumed" ;"' that "punitive damages may be awarded by the jury
even though the amount of actual damages is neither found nor
shown" ;79 and that punitive damages are "given as a kind of punishment to the defendant with a view of preventing similar wrongs in
80
the future."
The judge continued his charge by stating it was for the jury
to determine whether the four ministers had approved and sanctioned the advertisement by ratification. If it was found that they
did, then they too would be liable. The court defined ratification as
"the approval by a person of a prior act which did not bind him,
but which was professedly done on his account or on his behalf
whereby the act, the use of his name, the publication, is given effect
as if authorized by him in the very beginning.""1
Many written requests to charge were submitted to the court by
the attorneys for the defendants. Some were given by Judge Jones
and others were not. Several are of particular significance and
should be mentioned. While the court instructed, as requested by
the Times, that "mere negligence or carelessness is not evidence of
actual malice or malice in fact, and does not justify an award of
exemplary or punitive damages," 2 it refused to instruct that the
jury must be "convinced" of malice in the sense of "actual intent"
to harm or "gross negligence and recklessness" to make such an
award. 3 The court also declined to require that a verdict for the
SId. at 824.
78 Ibid.
19Id. at 825.
80
Id.at 825-26.
8
Id.at 825.
82Id. at 836.
I' Id. at 844.
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plaintiff differentiate between compensatory and punitive dam84
ages.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff assessing
500,000 dollars in damages against the defendants, and a judgment was entered against the defendants accordingly. 5 Thereafter, defendants made motions requesting the court to set aside the
verdict and to grant them a new trial.
In the motions for a new trial, the defendants claimed that during the course of the litigation the court had erred in a number of
its rulings. They contended that certain errors by the court as well
as the excessive verdict violated the Constitution."8 In addition,
the ministers claimed, for the first time, in their motions for a new
trial that they had not received a fair trial and that this was a violation of the Alabama and federal constitutions.8 7 Judge Jones denied
the Times' motion for a new trial and stated that the defendant
ministers had allowed their motions for a new trial to lapse and,
consequently, he could not consider them.8"
The Supreme Court of Alabama sustained the circuit court on
appeal.8" The question of jurisdiction was again raised by the
Times, and the appellate court held that the lower court had jurisdiction over the Times for three reasons. First, the court stated
that the activities of the Times in Alabama were more than sufficient
to meet the minimal standards required for service on an agent or
representative of the company; and the court declared that McKee,
who worked as a "stringer" for the Times and who was served by
Sullivan, was its agent. Therefore, service of process upon him
was good and sufficient service.
Secondly, the court held that the Times had been properly
served by substituted service under title 7, section 199 (1) of the
Alabama Code of 1940, as amended-the state's so-called "long
arm" statute. The court pointed out that under that law any nonresident person who is not qualified to do business in the state,
but who nonetheless actually does some business, work, or service
84
Id. at 846.
"Id. at 862-63. Note that the amount of the verdict was 1000 times greater
than the maximum fine of $500 under Alabama's criminal libel statute. See
ALA. CoDE ANN. tit. 14, § 350 (1958).
" Record, vol. 2, pp. 896-949, 970-98.
'T Id. at 977-78, 992-93.
88 Id. at 875, 970.
" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
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there, shall be deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State to
be his agent for the service of process in any action accruing from
or incidental to the business, work or service done by such a nonresident in the state of Alabama. The court concluded that the
cause of action in this case was connected with activities of the
Times in Alabama since "the publishing of advertisements was a
substantial part of the business of the Times, and its newspapers
were regularly sent into Alabama," and because the Times solicited
advertising in Alabama and called upon its "correspondent McKee"
to investigate "the truthfulness or falsity of the matters contained
in the advertisement after the letter from the plaintiff."00 Therefore,
the appellate tribunal held that the service under section 199 (1) was
valid.
Finally, the court held that the lower court was correct in finding that the Times, by requesting the circuit court to dismiss the
action against it for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
went beyond the question of jurisdiction of the person and thereby
made a general appearance. The appellate court stated the
"conclusions of the trial court in this aspect are in accord with the
doctrines of a majority of our sister states, and the doctrines of our
own decisions." 1
After ruling on jurisdiction, the Alabama Supreme Court discussed the merits of the appeal. In upholding the court below, it stated
that where "words published tend to injure a person libeled by them
in his reputation, profession, trade or business, or charge him with
an indictable offense, or tends to bring the individual into public contempt" they are "libelous per se," 2 and that under this doctrine
the matter complained of by Sullivan was libelous per se once thq
jury found that it was published of and concerning him. The court
further stated libel per se was actionable without "proof of pecuniary injury . . . such injury being implied,"0 8 and that actual

damages are presumed and need not be proved. 4
With respect to damages it is interesting to observe that, under
Alabama law, where it is established that a writing is libelous per se,
compensatory damages are presumed. However, an award of
0 Id. at 671, 144
So. 2d at 35.
91
Ibid.

o2Id. at 673, 144 So. 2d at 37.
9 Id. at 676, 144 So. 2d at 41.
Id. at 685-86, 144 So. 2d at 50.
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punitive damages in such a case apparently requires proof of actual
malice.95 Judge Jones refused to charge at the request of the Times
that the jury had to be convinced of malice, in the sense of actual
intent to harm, or gross negligence and recklessness, to award
punitive damages ;" and he declined to require that a verdict for the
plaintiff differentiate between compensatory and punitive damages.97
In the writer's opinion, the Alabama Supreme Court failed to come
really to grips with this apparently significant error in Judge Jones's
charge. The appellate tribunal handled the problem in rather an
oblique fashion by pointing out conduct of the Times that could
have justified the jury's making a finding of malice. In this regard,
the Supreme Court of Alabama stated:
The Times in its own files had articles already published which
would have demonstrated the falsity of the allegations in the advertisement. Upon demand by the Governor of Alabama, The
Times published a retraction of the advertisement insofar as the
Governor of Alabama was concerned. Upon receipt of the letter
from the plaintiff demanding a retraction of the allegations in the
advertisement, The Times had investigations made by a staff
correspondent, and by its "string" correspondent. Both made a
report demonstrating the falsity of the allegations. Even in the
face of these reports, The Times adamantly refused to right the
wrong it knew it had done the plaintiff. In the trial below none of
the defendants questioned the falsity of the allegations of the
advertisement.
On the other hand, during his testimony it was the contention of
the Secretary of The Times that the advertisement was "substantially correct." In the face of this cavalier ignoring of the falsity
of the advertisement, the jury could not have but been impressed
with the bad faith of The Times, and its maliciousness inferable
98
therefrom.

The highest court of Alabama summarily rejected constitutional
arguments made by the Times with the statements that the "First
Amendment of the U. S. Constitution does not protect libelous publications" and the "Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State
action and not private action.""9 It approved the trial court's charge
"See id. at 685-86, 144 So. 2d at 50, and cases cited therein.
Record, vol. 2, p. 844; id., vol. 3, p. 1060.
'T Id., vol. 2, p. 846.
273 Ala. at 686, 144 So. 2d at 50-51. (Emphasis added.) See note 34
supra.

" Id. at 676, 144 So. 2d at 40.
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as a "fair, accurate, and clear expression of the governing legal
principles,"' 00 and sustained the lower court's determination that
the damages awarded by the verdict were not excessive.
The court quickly brushed aside the arguments made by the
four individual appellants. It said that their exceptions to the trial
court's charge and their requests to charge which the trial court
refused to give were either too indefinite or not "expressed in the
exact and appropriate terms of the law"'' and, therefore, were
not subject to review. The court called the individual appellants'
objection to the alleged mispronunciation of the word "Negro" in
the court below "mere quibbling."'0 2
The ministers also sought a reversal on the ground that the
courtroom was segregated during the trial and on the further
ground that the trial judge was not duly and legally elected because
of deprivation of voting rights to Negroes. The appellate tribunal
took the position that since these matters were not presented during
the trial they could not be raised on appeal.10 3
The Alabama Supreme Court also decided that the motions
of the individual defendants for a new trial were discontinued.
Therefore, "those assignments by the individual appellants attempting to raise questions as to the weight of the evidence, and
the extensiveness of the damages are ineffective and present nothing
for review" because these "matters can be presented only by a motion for a new trial"'

04

C. The Supreme Court Decision
It was against the foregoing background that this case was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court by the Times and
Reverends Abernathy, Shuttlesworth, Seay, and Lowery. The Court
granted certiorari on January 7, 1963 ;105 and after hearing arguments on January 6 and 7, 1964, it rendered its opinion on
March 9, 1964."06

The Supreme Court did not discuss the question of the Alabama
courts' jurisdiction over the Times, although this issue was argued at
1o0Id. at 680, 144 So. 2d at 44.
201 Id. at 681, 144 So. 2d at 45.
102Ibid.

10Id. at 681, 144 So. 2d at 45.
101 Id. at 682, 144 So. 2d at 46.
"5 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 371 U.S. 946 (1963).
"'376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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length by the Times in its brief to the Supreme Court. By its
silence, it is not clear whether the Court completely agreed with the
views expressed by the Supreme Court of Alabama on the subject,
or whether the Court considered that the Alabama courts had gained
jurisdiction solely because the Times had mistakenly converted a
special appearance into a general one. In any event, the Court
must have been satisfied that the Alabama courts had proper jurisdiction over the Times.
The respondent, L. B. Sullivan, raised three defenses which he
contended removed his case from constitutional scrutiny. First, he
contended that the fourteenth amendment is directed against state
action and not private action. Secondly, he argued that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press were
inapplicable because the allegedly libelous statements were published
as part of a paid "commercial advertisement" which the Supreme
Court had held in Valentine v. Chrestensen1 7 was not protected by
the first amendment. Finally, he took the position that the first
amendment does not protect libelous publications.
The Supreme Court was not swayed by any of these arguments.
The Court said the proposition that the fourteenth amendment was
directed against state action had no application to the instant case.
It took the view that although this was a civil law suit between private
parties, state action was involved because the Alabama courts had
applied a state rule of law which the petitioners claimed imposed
invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and
press. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brennan,
said that the "test is not the form in which state power has been
applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been
exercised."' 08 Thus, the application of a state rule of law by the
courts of Alabama involved state power which is subject to the
fourteenth amendment.
The Court also swept aside the respondent's argument that the
advertisement was "commercial advertising" and therefore not
protected by the first amendment. The Court said the respondent's
reliance on the Chrestensen case was "wholly misplaced."' 1 9 It was
pointed out that in Chrestensen the Supreme Court had held that a
"city ordinance forbidding street distribution of commercial and
07 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
108376 U.S.
20DIbid.

at 265.
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business advertising matter did not abridge the First Amendment
freedoms, even as applied to a handbill having a commercial message on one side, but a protest against certain official action on the
other."' 10 The Court went on to state that its holding in Chrestensen was based on the "factual conclusions that the handbill was
'purely commercial advertising' and that the protest against official
action had been added only to evade the ordinance.""'
By contrast, the Court did not consider the publication involved in the instant case to be a commercial advertisement. "It
communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances,
protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of
a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern."' 12 The Court said the fact that
the advertisement in this case was paid for was immaterial and that
any
other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying
"editorial advertisements" of this type, and so might shut off an
important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas
by persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities-who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though
they are not members of the press. 113
The Court concluded that the effect of this would be "to shackle
the First Amendment in its attempt to secure 'the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
14
sources'.1
The Court also rejected the respondent's contention that the
first amendment does not protect libelous publications. The respondent relied heavily on statements by the Court to the effect
that libelous utterances are not protected by the Constitution. 1 8
The Court said that those statements did not foreclose its inquiry
into the instant case because none of the cases containing such
120 Ibid.
111

Id. at 266.

112Ibid.
"I" Ibid.

:14Ibid.

.15
See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961); Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Farmers Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S.
525 (1959); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Beaubarnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348-49
(1946); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
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statements "sustained the use of libel laws to impose sanctions upon
expression critical of the official conduct of public officials."1 1 The
Court pointed out that Schenectady Union Publishing Co. v.
Sweeney'1 7 was the only previous case that presented the question
of constitutional limitations upon the power to award damages for
libel of a public official, and in that case the Court was equally
divided so that the question was never decided. The Court continued
its rationale by stating that in "deciding the question now, we are
compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight
to the epithet 'libel' than we have to other 'mere labels' of state
law.' 1 18 The Court concluded that like "the various other formulae
for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this
Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from Constitutional
limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the
First Amendment.""'
Thus, the Court rejected the three grounds
asserted for insulating the judgment of the Alabama courts from
constitutional scrutiny.
Under the Alabama rule of law, as applied in this case, a written
publication is libelous per se if the words tend to injure a person's
reputation or tend to bring the individual into public contempt.
The standard is met if the words are such as to injure an individual
in his public office or impute misconduct to him in his office. A jury
must find that such words were published of or concerning the
plaintiff, but "where the plaintiff is a public official his place in the
governmental hierarchy is sufficient evidence to support a finding
that his reputation has been affected by statements that reflect
upon the agency of which he is in charge. "120
Once it is established that a statement is libelous per se and
that it was published of and concerning the plaintiff, the defendant
has no defense under the Alabama rule of law except truth. Unless
the defendant can prove to the jury's satisfaction that the statement involved is true in all particulars, general damages are presumed and may be awarded without proof of pecuniary injury.
Recovery of punitive damages apparently requires proof of actual
malice. If a defendant retracts or corrects the defamatory matter
12 376 U.S. at 268.
1 316 U.S. 642 (1942).
118 376 U.S. at 269.
1D Ibid.
11o Id. at 267.
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under certain circumstances prescribed by statute, 121 he is entitled
to a complete defense against the assessment of punitive damages.
However, good faith motives and belief in the truth do not negate an
inference of malice, but may be considered by the jury in the mitigation of punitive damages.
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Alabama rule of law as applied to an action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct abridged the freedom of speech
and of the press guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments.' 22 In the process of rationalizing its determination of this
issue, the Court discussed certain events in the Nation's history as
well as key judicial decisions on the interpretation of the first amendment to show the scope of the protection afforded expressions concerning public affairs and public officials by that amendment. The
analysis clearly depicted a profound national commitment to free,
uninhibited debate and expression on public affairs and about public
officials. The Court's discussion also made it clear that despite the
abuses and harm which result from it, such as exaggeration, inaccurate and false statements, half-truths, and damaged reputations, liberty of expression on matters relating to government and
123
involving public officials is a keystone of democracy.
Against this background, the Court considered the safeguards
of the Alabama rule of law to see whether they adequately protected freedom of speech and press as guaranteed by the first and
fourteenth amendments. The Court commenced the analysis by
comparing civil and criminal libel in Alabama. The Court set forth
as a premise that "what a State may not constitutionally bring about
by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its
civil law of libel,' 24 and then proceeded to show that the civil law
of libel in Alabama had fewer safeguards than criminal libel in that
state. For instance, the maximum fine for criminal libel is 500
dollars, 12 as compared with the 500,000 dollar verdict in the instant
case. Moreover, anyone accused of violating the criminal libel
statute has the criminal law safeguards such as requirements of an
indictment and proof beyond reasonable doubt, as well as the limi121 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 915 (1958).
12
The text of the amendments is set out in note 3 supra.

123

124

376 U.S. at 269-77.

Id. at 277.

12'ALA.

CODE ANN. tit.

14, § 350 (1958).
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tation upon double jeopardy. None of these safeguards are available to the defendant in an action for civil libel in Alabama. The
Court concluded that the "Alabama law of civil libel is 'a form of
regulation that creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly
greater than those that attend reliance upon the criminal law.' "126
The defense of truth was not considered an adequate safeguard
either. The Court said:
Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it
on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be
deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that
the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars .... Under

such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred
from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be
true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether
it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.
They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the
unlawful zone." ...

The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits

the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and
127
Fourteenth Amendments.

Thus, the Supreme Court decided that the Alabama rule of law
as applied in the instant case abridged freedom of speech and of the
press as guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments since
the Alabama rule failed to provide adequate safeguards for the
protection of those liberties.
After holding that the Alabama rule was contrary to the first and
fourteenth amendments, the Court stated:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" that is,
with knowledge that it was1 28false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.

The rule adopted by the Court is similar to the one stated in
the Kansas case of Coleman v. MacLennan,2 ' which has been followed by a number of state courts. The Court's rule is based on
120
376 U.S. at 278, citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963).
17 376 U.S. at 279. (Citations omitted.)
1Id. at 279-80.
"'78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908). See also New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 n.20 (1964).
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the balancing of "rights." The Court took the view that freedom
of speech and of the press are not absolute rights: That although
uninhibited expression and discussion about public affairs and public
officials are an essential part of democracy and, consequently, cannot be shackled by the imposition of the standard of absolute truth
upon those who engage in such discussion, there are limitations
to the rights of free speech and press. It was the Court's position
that those constitutional guarantees do not include false and
malicious utterances and that a public official has the right to have
his reputation in public office protected from them.
As the Alabama rule was inconsistent with the federal rule, the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Alabama Supreme
Court and remanded the case. Since the respondent might seek a
new trial under this holding, the Court stated that considerations
of effective administration required it to review the evidence in the
record to determine whether it could constitutionally support a
judgment for the respondent. The Court then analyzed the evidence
that had been presented against the defendants. It concluded, with
respect to the individuals, that even if it were assumed that they
authorized the use of their names on the advertisement, there was
no evidence whatsoever to show that they were aware of erroneous
statements or in any way reckless in that regard. Consequently,
there was no showing of actual malice as required by the federal
rule. With regard to The New York Times, the Court reached the
conclusion that even though the evidence against it might support a
finding of negligence for failing to discover misstatements in the
advertisement upon which the case was based, the evidence in the
record was insufficient to show the gross negligence or recklessness
necessary to support a finding of actual malice. Consequently, as
in the case of the individual defendants, the judgment against the
Times was without constitutional support.

II. QUESTIONS RAISED OR SUGGESTED By THE CASE
The analysis of the Sullivan case from its incipiency to its final
disposition by the United States Supreme Court suggests a variety
of questions, and it is not my intention to try to deal exhaustively
with all of these. However, there are several problem areas which
I believe are more significant than the others and discussion will be
concentrated on them.
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A. The Adequacy of the Criterion
Adopted By the Supreme Court
The resolution of the question of the extent to which constitutional protections for free speech and press limit a state's power
to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct involves the balancing of several factors: protection of an individual's reputation in public office
against false and defamatory statements; the public's interest in
the free flow of information about public officials and public affairs;
and the right of persons to freedom of speech and of the press as
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. To strike the
proper balance among these various factors is not an easy task.
After weighing and considering these factors in Sullivan, the
Supreme Court concluded that the first and fourteenth amendments prohibit "a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not."' 3 0
The rule adopted by the Supreme Court in effect nationalized or
unified part of the law of libel. Prior to Sullivan many state courts
had ruled on the question of the legal liability of the press for
publishing false and defamatory statements about public officials
in connection with their official duties. 3 ' It was generally agreed
by the state courts that the publication of adverse criticism about a
public official that is factually correct is in the realm of fair comment, and is a good defense to any libel action a criticized official
may institute against the publisher.'3 2 However, the state courts had
split views with respect to the situation where a publisher, in good
faith, reported a false statement about a public official relating to
his conduct in office. A majority of the state courts which encountered this problem held that the publisher was liable for such
misstatement. 3 3 A minority of state courts have extended the
180
Id.
at 279-80.
...
Since the courts have treated candidates for public office the same as
public officials, the principles stated about public officials should apply to
candidates for public office.
...
See Boyer, Fair Comment, 15 OHio ST. L.J. 280 (1954); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 606-10 (1938); 37 GEO. L.f. 404 (1949); 62 IIAv. L. REV.
1207 (1949).
..For further discussion and state-by-state authorities, see A. S. Abell
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privilege of fair comment to protect a publisher from liability for
false and defamatory statements made in good faith about a public
official. The rule adopted by the Supreme Court in Sullivan is
basically the same as the view espoused by a minority of the state
courts ;134 and as the federal rule is in terms of the protection the
Constitution affords every person in the exercise of public criticism, the Supreme Court has, in effect, unified the law of libel on
this point since the majority view simply would not afford a person
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press
expressed in the rule adopted by the Supreme Court. In brief, the
majority view has been eliminated by the position taken by the
Supreme Court.
Of the two views followed by the various states, the minority
view was the more liberal since it gave the greater encouragement
to the free flow of information concerning public affairs. This
liberal position was, in effect, followed by the Supreme Court.
However, three Justices of the Supreme Court felt that the first and
fourteenth amendments demanded that the Court adopt an even
more liberal position. Justices Black, Goldberg, and Douglas
argued in their concurring opinions that the Constitution gives
people and the press an unconditional right to criticize official conduct; that it does not matter whether such criticism is made in good
faith or maliciously, or whether it is true or false; and the Court
should adopt a rule giving recognition to this principle.
The chief difference between the rule enunciated by the Court
and the one urged by the concurring members is the "test of malice."
The Court has taken the position that the Constitution protects the
person, who, in good faith, makes a false and defamatory statement
about a public official's conduct; however, such a statement "made
with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
85
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not,"' is not privileged
and the injured official may recover damages. The Court's rule
Co. v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267, 273, 176 A.2d 340, 342-43 (1961) ; Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 875, 896 & n.102
(1949); RESTAT ENT, TORTS § 598, comment a at 261 (1938); Annots.,
110 A.L.R. 412 (1937), 150 A.L.R. 358 (1944).
Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908), is the
.8.
leading case expounding the minority view. It was cited by the Court in
support
of the federal rule that it adopted. 376 U.S. at 280-82.
13
' Id. at 279-80.
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places the burden of proving "malice" upon the public official bringing the action.
The "test of malice" presents some real difficulties. " 'Malice,'
...is an elusive, abstract concept hard to prove and hard to disIn fact, if the "malice" rule had been in effect when
prove."
the Sullivan case was tried, I believe the defendants would have
still had to carry their case to the Supreme Court to get relief. Mr.
Justice Black observed in his concurring opinion that the record
did not "indicate that any different verdict would have been rendered ... whatever the Court had charged the jury about 'malice,'
'truth,' 'good motives,' 'justifiable ends,' or any other legal formulas
which in theory would protect the press."' 3' That observation appears to be sound. The nature and circumstances of this case were
such that the great probability is that even if the trial court had
charged that there must be a finding of malice in order to hold the
defendants liable, the jury would have made such a finding. The
Alabama Supreme Court even stated in its opinion that the conduct
of the Times had been such as to impress the jury with its "bad
faith" and "its maliciousness inferable therefrom."' 138 Consequently, there can be little doubt that if the Supreme Court rule requiring the "test of malice" had been in effect at the time of the trial
of this case, the chances are that the jury in Montgomery, Alabama,
would have returned a verdict against the defendants anyway. I believe, however, that such a verdict would have ultimately been set
aside by the Supreme Court. Its opinion in the present case substantiates that view since the Court analyzed the evidence contained
in the record and found that there was no showing of actual malice
as required by the federal rule.13'
The "test of malice" principle leaves the door open for more
litigation to be resolved eventually by the Supreme Court. A public
officer who feels that a defamatory statement about his conduct in
office associates him with the locally popular side of a highly controversial and bitterly disputed issue-such as the race question in the
Deep South-may well bring suit. With the determination of the
question of malice basically in the hands of the jury, he would know
188 Id. at 293 (concurring opinion).
'7 Id. at 295 (concurring opinion).
""New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 686, 144 So. 2d 25,
51 (1962).
189376 U.S. at 285-92.
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that his chances of prevailing on the thinnest kind of evidence would
be excellent and thus would be encouraged to bring suit. In such a
prejudicial atmosphere, the person who made the statement might
well have to appeal to the Supreme Court before obtaining relief.
Thus, the question of whether the proof presented by the public
official who instituted the libel action was sufficient to support a
finding of actual malice would again be before the Supreme Court.
The Court must carefully consider this question, whenever it is
raised, in order to prevent the law of libel from being used in
some states as a method of suppressing expressions which support
the cause of racial equality or other controversial causes.
Under the Supreme Court rule, a person is culpable of actual
malice if he makes a false statement against a public official "with
reckless disregard" of whether it is false or not. Precisely what
constitutes "reckless disregard" is an open question. It depends on
the facts and circumstances of each particular case. As state courts
have had little experience in applying the standard of "reckless
disregard" for "malice" in libel suits, 140 and as this is an area in

which minds can easily differ, 141 further litigation concerning the
application of this standard can be expected; and, in my opinion,
at least some of it will have to be resolved by the Supreme Court.
As there is plenty of room for litigation under the "actual malice"
rule, it can be expected that newspapers and other communications
media will carefully watch their activities in certain areas of the
Deep South where there is a profound feeling among the white
populace against interference with racial problems by "outside agitators." In such places, juries and state courts are likely to be highly
prejudiced and accept a substandard amount of evidence as proof of
"malice." Certainly persons in the communications field will not
want to spend the large sums of money necessary to appeal cases to
the Supreme Court in order to obtain relief. Consequently, it is
logical to expect them to proceed with caution in the Deep South.
In exercising such caution, communications media will be deterred from freely criticising the conduct of public officials for fear
See Hallen, Characterof Belief Necessary for the ConditionalPrivilege
in Defamation,25 ILL. L. REv. 865 (1931); Comment, 69 HARv. L. REv. 879,
929-31 (1956).
1,1 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 686, 144
So. 2d 25, 51 (1962). Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
285-88 (1964).
1"0

1965]

NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN

345

of the expense of becoming involved in litigation. There will be a
tendency to play it safe. This will have the effect of dampening the
free flow of information about certain public issues, particularly
those relating to the struggle of the Negro in the Deep South for
racial equality.
There would be much less chance of litigation under the rule
urged by the concurring members of the Supreme Court. Under
this rule a person could make malicious statements about a public
official's conduct in office without being held liable for damages in a
libel action. Consequently, the area in which a public official could
sue successfully would be reduced to defamatory statements about
his private life.
Although the rule advocated by the concurring Justices would
give the people and press an unconditional right to criticize a public
official's conduct in office and thus would stimulate the free flow of
information about public affairs by reducing the possibility of libel
litigation, such a rule is not without its shortcoming. At the outset
of this discussion on the adequacy of the standard adopted by the
Supreme Court, it was stated that the resolution of the question of the
extent to which the constitutional protections for free speech and
press limit a state's power to award damages in a libel action brought
by a public official against critics of his official conduct involves the
balancing of several factors: protection of an individual's reputation
in public office against false and defamatory statements; the public's
interest in the free flow of information about public officials and public
affairs; and the right of persons to freedom of speech and of the
press as guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. The
rule advocated by Justices Black, Goldberg, and Douglas is heavily
weighted in favor of the free flow of information and the protection
of freedom of speech and of the press. The emphasis is placed on the
need in a democratic society for public affairs to be freely debated,
discussed, and criticized so that the people can better determine and
resolve public issues. This rule, however, gives virtually no protection to an individual's reputation in public office, and it can be
argued that therein lies its failing.
In opposition to the "liberal" rule urged by the concurring
Justices it might be argued that maliciously made defamatory statements cannot help the people of the country resolve public issues;
in fact, such statements are intentionally made to mislead and mis-
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guide the populace and, consequently, may have just that result.
In the light of this, it may be contended that it is more reasonable
to protect the reputation of a public official than to protect malicious
falsehoods which can do nothing but prevent or interfere with the
sound resolution of public issues. Therefore, the rights of freedom
of speech and of the press should end when a person maliciously
makes false statements about a public official's conduct in office;
and at that point, the injured public official should have the right
to recover damages by proving that such statements were made
with "actual malice."
On the basis of the foregoing analysis of the "actual malice"
rule adopted by the Court and the "liberal" rule urged by the concurring Justices, it may be concluded that both rules are deficient in
some respects. It is submitted, however, that the litigation problem and the adverse effect on the free flow of information which
may result therefrom under the "actual malice" rule are of greater
consequence than the damage to reputations of public officials which
may result under the "liberal" rule. I am inclined to agree with
Mr. Justice Black's comment:
This Nation, I suspect, can live in peace without libel suits based
on public discussions of public affairs and public officials. But I
doubt that a country can live in freedom where its people can be
made to suffer physically or financially for criticizing their government, its actions, or its officials. "For a representative democracy
ceases to exist the moment that the public functionaries are by any
means absolved from their responsibility to their constituents;
and this happens whenever the constituent can be restrained in
any manner from speaking, writing, or publishing his opinion upon
any public measure, or upon the conduct of those who may advise
or execute it." 14 2
Idealistically, however, it would be best if the law were in such
a state as to encourage the maximum flow of information about
public affairs and at the same time give greater protection to a public
official's reputation in office than he would receive under the "liberal"
rule. I believe this could be accomplished if the "liberal" rule were
adopted and if Congress passed legislation giving a public official a
"right of reply." This would enable a public official who felt that
misstatements of fact had been made about him in the press or other
media of communications to answer his critics in the same medium
",376 U.S. at 297 (concurring opinion).
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that the alleged misstatements were made. For instance, if a newspaper published statements about a public official which he considered
to be false, that official under the suggested legislation would be
able to respond immediately by supplying a written reply which would
have to be published by that newspaper. 143 Many nations of the
world have had excellent experience with such legislation,1 44 and
it is generally agreed among those who have written on this subject
that Congress does have the power to enact such legislation under
its power to regulate interstate commerce and its authority over the
145
postal system.
The combination of the "liberal" rule and the "right of reply"
legislation would stimulate the free discussion of public affairs so
necessary in a democratic society and, at the same time, give sufficient protection to the reputations of public officials. In fact, from
the viewpoint of actually protecting a public official's reputation in
office, the "right of reply" is better than a libel action. Frequently
what happens in a libel suit is that there is some initial publicity
when the suit is brought, then a long period of silence until the
case is tried, and a small amount of publicity after the case is over.
Usually the press space given to the final determination of a libel
suit that is not of sensational importance is extremely limited and
is generally relegated to some inconspicuous place in the newspaper.
Consequently, even if the public official wins the case, the public
as a whole is often unaware that his reputation has been vindicated.
On the other hand, if the public official were able immediately to
"' Naturally the details of such legislation would have to be worked out.
Such things as the amount of space that would be given for a reply in a
newspaper, methods of replying through media other than the press, the
time within which a public official would have to demand the right to reply,
etc., would have to be determined. It is not my intention to spell out in this
article the points that would go into such legislation, but it is my purpose
merely to discuss the principle of the "right of reply." For detailed discus-

sions of such legislation, see 1 CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATION 145-99, 179-95 (1947) ; Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Al-

ternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REv. 867 (1948); Leflar, Legal

Remedies for Defamation, 6 ARK. L. REV. 423 (1952).
144 For discussions of such legislation in other nations, see ROTHENBERG,
THE NEWSPAPER 114-32 (1948); and 1 UNITED NATIONS, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 254-66 (1950). The best known "right of reply" law is probably

France's "Droit de Response," which is described in 1 UNITED NATIONS,
op. cit. supra at 247-48.
"' See Leflar, supra note 143, at 450-54; Pedrick, Freedom of the Press
and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q.
581, 607 (1964) ; Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 995
(1953).
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explain an alleged misstatement of fact, the public would be more
aware of his position and better able to judge him fairly. As it is
now, the news coverage given to such libel suits is often unfair to
both the public official involved and to the general public because
frequently all of the material facts are never made known to the
public.
B. The Question of Due Process
There are a number of examples in the record which indicate
that the defendants, particularly the individual defendants, did not
receive a fair trial. This is not significant as far as the final outcome of the case is concerned because the case was not decided on
the basis of due process, but it is important to illustrate the difficulty
of obtaining a fair trial in certain areas of the Deep South when
racial issues are involved; and it serves further to raise the question
of what, if anything, can be done to remedy this situation. After
considering some of the points that lead to the conclusion that the
defendants did not receive a fair trial, the question posed will be
discussed.
The advertisement that the "Committee to Defend Martin Luther
King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South" published in the
Times stirred up a storm of protest. Government officials in Alabama as well as the white community as a whole resented the advertisement and obviously had a feeling of hostility toward those associated with it.148 The white community wanted those responsible
to be punished and action taken to prevent such a thing from happening again.147 The law suit brought by Commissioner L. B. Sullivan
in the guise of libel was for just that purpose: to suppress future
expressions supporting racial equality and sharply criticizing the
status quo by severely punishing the defendants in the instant
case.

1 48

In such an atmosphere it was extremely difficult, at best, for the
defendants to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. The chance of
having an impartial jury was made even more dismal because the
local press was allowed to take pictures in the courtroom of the
jurors and because television cameras were permitted to follow the
See notes 48 & 49 supra and accompanying text.
See generally Record, vol. 5, pp. 1999-2077.
"8Cf.
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263-64 (1952).

"*
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jury to the very door of the juryroom. 149 With the community
as a whole and their friends and neighbors in particular watching
them so closely through the media of local press and television, it is
hard to conceive how the jury in such an atmosphere could have
possibly reached a fair and impartial verdict.
The late Judge Walter B. Jones, who presided over the trial,
was a staunch segregationist who did not believe in the equality of
men, but in white supremacy. 150 He insisted on a segregated courtroom,' 1' referred to the fourteenth amendment as "a pariah and an
outcast,'1 6 2 and stressed his belief in "white man's justice. 153
I believe Judge Jones's intense belief in the need to preserve the
status quo in the South prevented him from treating all who appeared before him equally and fairly. For example, he generally referred to the white lawyers who appeared before him in the Sullivan case as "Mr.""' 4 However, nowhere in the entire record does he
refer to the Negro attorneys who appeared for the four individual
defendants as "Mr.," showing that Judge Jones must have believed
that Negroes were too inferior ever to be called "Mr." To brand an
attorney with this mark of inferiority before a jury, as Judge Jones
did, l places the attorney at an obvious disadvantage because if the
court does not show respect for an attorney, the chances are that the
jury will not either.
An examination of the court's charge with respect to damages
and the amount of damages awarded by the jury gives further
insight into the question of fair trial. The plaintiff asked for and
received a verdict awarding him damages in the sum of 500,000
dollars. There was no evidence of any special damages 6' suffered
11 See notes 50-52 supra,and accompanying text.
1"0 See generally W. B. Jones, Court Room Segregation, 22 AtA. LAw.
190-92
1 0 (1961).
5 ld, at 190-91. Cf. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963), where
the Court held that state-compelled "segregation in a court of justice is a
manifest violation of the State's duty to deny no one the equal protection of
its laws."
W. B. Jones, supra note 150, at 191.
Id. at 192.
See, e.g., Record, vol. 2, p. 570.
1 Ibid.
10-

3

'
104

The damages in Sullivan may be divided into two categories: compensatory or actual damages and punitive or exemplary damages. Compensatory
or actual damages consist of general and special damages. General damages
are those which the law presumes to flow naturally and necessarily from
the tortious act and may be awarded without proof of any specific amount to
compensate the plaintiff for the injury done him. Special damages are those
10'
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by the plaintiff as a consequence of the advertisement. In fact,
none of the witnesses who testified on his behalf stated that
they believed the statements contained in the advertisement, and
five of the six witnesses who testified concerning the impact
of the alleged defamatory statements upon the plaintiff's reputation affirmatively testified that they did not believe any of
these statements.'5 7 It is just as difficult to understand how the
plaintiff suffered any general damages. It is hard to conceive
how any reasonable person could say that as a natural and necessary
consequence of the advertisement which appeared in the Times the
plaintiff's reputation as a public official was injured. As Mr. Justice
Black pointed out in his concurring opinion, "viewed realistically,
this record lends support to an inference that instead of being damaged Commissioner Sullivan's political, social, and financial prestige
has likely been enhanced by the Times' publication."' 8 Since there
was virtually no basis for the jury to award compensatory damages
(special and general damages), it is submitted that the entire award
of 500,000 dollars must have been for punitive damages.' 0
Under Alabama law, an award in a libel action for punitive damages-as opposed to one for compensatory damages-apparently
In light of this, it is submitted
requires proof of actual malice.'
that the court should have affirmatively instructed the jury as to
the meaning of "actual malice" so that the jury would have at
least known what standard of proof was required for a finding of
which actually result from the commission of the tortious act, but are not
such a necessary result that they will be implied by law, as in the case of
general damages, as necessarily flowing from the wrongful act. These
damages are of an unusual or extraordinary nature, and though they may
naturally flow from the wrong, they are not the necessary consequences
of the wrong complained of. Punitive or exemplary damages are those given,
exclusive of compensatory damages, to punish and make an example of the
wrongdoer. See generally 25 C.J.S. Damages §§ 1-2 (1941); 18 WoRDs &
PRRASES General Danages 276-87 (1956); 39A WoRDs & PHRASES Special
Damages 152-68 (1953).
..Record, vol. 2, pp. 623, 636, 638, 647, 651, 667.

376 U.S. at 294.

1258

I" The Tihes in its requests to charge asked the court to require that a
verdict for the plaintiff differentiate between compensatory and punitive
damages, but the court refused. Record, vol. 2, p. 846. Consequently, there
is no way of knowing with absolute certainty how much of the $500,000 verdict the jury awarded for compensatory damages and how much it awarded
in punitive damages. However, for the reasons stated in the text above,
the entire $500,000 must be considered as an award for punitive damages.
"' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 685-86, 144 So. 2d
25, 50; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 262 (1964).
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"actual malice." This was particularly important in this case since
it is logical to assume that the entire award was for punitive damages, which means that the jury made this rather fantastic award of
500,000 dollars with incomplete knowledge of the fundamental
principles governing an award for punitive damages.
The court's charge was highly inadequate in this regard. Judge
Jones stated in his charge that the statements in question were
161
libelous per se and as such, "falsity and malice are presumed."
The court further stated that "punitive damages may be awarded
by the jury even though the amount of actual damages is neither
found nor shown."' 6 2 This meant that if the jury found nothing
in the evidence to justify a finding of compensatory damages, it
was free to make an award of punitive damages without regard to
malice since the court had stated that malice is presumed. Obviously
this is wrong. The charge should have made it clear to the jury that
punitive damages could only be awarded if actual malice were
shown, and the court should have explained what "actual malice"
meant. However, the court failed to make such an explanation
and refused the Times' request to charge that the jury must be
"convinced" of malice in the sense of "actual intent" to harm or
"gross negligence and recklessness" to make an award of punitive
damages. It is submitted that the court's refusal to grant this request to charge was such a grave error that.it amounted to a denial
of a fair trial.' 63
I believe this conclusion is especially justified in the light of the
Alabama law on criminal libel, which limits the fine for conviction
under that law to 500 dollars.' 4 As the Supreme Court pointed
out in its opinion, "what a state may not constitutionally bring about
by means of criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil
vol. 2, p. 824.
"'Record,
62
Id. at 825.
...
The Alabama Supreme Court sustained the trial court and approved
its charge. However, the Alabama appellate court failed to come to grips
with the alleged error in the trial court's charge discussed in the text above;
and by rather strained reasoning skirted the problem by referring to certain conduct of the Tihes which would have justified an inference of malice on
the part of the jury. See 273 Ala. at 686, 144 So. 2d at 51. Quaere: Did the
Alabama Supreme Court wrongfully invade the fact-finding province of the
jury? Regardless of the answer to that question, it is quite clear that the
conclusion of the Alabama Supreme Court that facts in the case justified
an inference of malice against the Times was in error. See id. at 286-88,
144 So. 2d at 51-52.
...
ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 350 (1958).
2
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law of libel." A verdict for punitive damages in the sum of 500,000
dollars, which is one thousand times more than the maximum fine
under the criminal statute, goes far beyond vindication and actually
amounts to suppression of freedom of expression. The verdict here
was clearly excessive and by ordinary standards of fairness should
have been set aside by the Alabama courts."0 5
Aside from the foregoing, there were other, perhaps more technical, reasons why it may be argued that the individual defendants
were deprived of due process and equal protection of the laws as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment and, therefore, did not
receive a fair trial. For instance, the courtroom was segregated,
which is a "manifest violation of the State's duty to deny no one
the equal protection of its laws."' 6 Furthermore, it is common
knowledge that Negroes are excluded from jury panels in Montgomery, Alabama, and this practice, in and of itself, has been held
sufficient to deny a Negro defendant a fair trial. 6 7 Finally, it may
be contended that the long-standing exclusion of Negroes from
voting for judges in Montgomery County insured that a judge who
reflected the prejudice of the white community who elected him
would try this case; and, consequently, this prevented the defendants from receiving a fair trial. 6 s
I believe the discussion to this point has clearly shown that defendants did not receive a fair trial. As previously pointed out,
Sullivan is not unique in this regard. It is a matter of general
knowledge that frequently persons receive unfair trials in state

courts in certain areas of the Deep South in cases involving racial
issues. Sullivan is another example of this and serves as a point
of departure for a discussion of what, if anything, can be done about
this problem.
15 Cf. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co. v. Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.
1948).
...
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963). The record in Sullivan
does not show that the courtroom was segregated. However, the writer has

talked with a number of persons who participated in the trial, and there is

no question that the courtroom was segregated.
...
See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); United States ex rel.
Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915
(1963);
cf. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 408 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
'8 For a summary of voter discrimination in Montgomery County, see
1961 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS Comm'x ANN. RE,. 26. See also Alabama ex rel.
Gallion v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 848 (M.D. Ala. 1960), aff'd, 285 F.2d 430
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 913 (1961). Compare Alabama v. United
States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
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Many thousands of dollars were spent on this litigation by The
New York Times, and a substantial amount was spent on behalf
of the four individual defendants by two civil rights organizations,
the Gandhi Society for Human Rights and The Southern Christian
Leadership Conference. In addition, a committee of distinguished
lawyers was formed to help the individual defendants on their appeal
to the Supreme Court.'6 9 After the expenditure of literally tens of
thousands of dollars, and hundreds, if not thousands, of hours by
attorneys on behalf of the defendants, this case was finally heard
by the Supreme Court, and the injustice which had occurred in the
Alabama courts was corrected.
I think most would agree that it is nothing short of shameful for
persons and organizations to have to spend continually huge sums
of money and tremendous amounts of time taking cases involving
racial issues on appeal from state courts in the Deep South to the
Supreme Court in order to get relief from decisions molded by racial
prejudice and hate. However, the problem of what to do about it
is not an easy one. So often, as in the instant case, a racial issue
is the underlying theme of the litigation, but the cause of action
is one-such as libel-which is usually adjudicated by state courts.170
There can be little doubt that if there was some way of removing
this type of case from state courts in the Deep South, the cause of
justice would be better served; but again, the question is how.
One way in which this objective may be partially accomplished
is through the enactment of legislation permitting the removal of
these kind of cases from state to federal courts."" Federal courts
2.Theodore W. Kheel, Esq., an attorney in New York City, organized
the committee of lawyers known as "Lawyers' Committee on the Alabama
Libel Suits" to help the individual defendants in their appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. Through this committee the services of William P.
Rogers, Esq., former Attorney General of the United States, and the writer

were secured to argue this case on behalf of the four ministers before the
Supreme Court. Mr. Rogers and I donated our services to this cause as did
many other lawyers who contributed to the preparation of the brief and other
papers on appeal.
""oCauses of action normally brought in state courts may sometimes be

adjudicated in federal district courts on the basis of diversity of citizenship.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958).

...
At present, a defendant can remove a case from a state to a federal
court to protect his civil rights. However, this right of removal is very
restricted. The cases interpreting this law have held that the denial of civil
rights must be by state constitution or statute. Denials by illegal or prejudiced
acts of state officers, judges, or juries are not sufficient grounds for removal.

354
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in the Deep South, especially the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, have been vastly more fair and just in handling litigation
involving racial issues than state courts in that region.172 Consequently, it is suggested that federal legislation should be enacted to
permit a defendant to remove a case from a state court to a federal
court when it can be shown to the satisfaction of the federal district
court to which the case is to be removed that the moving party
would not receive a fair trial as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment if the case in question should be tried in the state court. It
would be expected that this legislation would require the federal
courts to base their exercise of this power upon a rule of reason,
i.e., the test would be whether an ordinarily reasonable person would
conclude under the facts and circumstances presented that the moving party would not receive a fair trial in the particular state court
involved. To protect the parties against a federal district court is
unreasonably exercising or refusing to exercise this power, the
legislation should allow for the immediate appeal of the district

court's decision to the federal court of appeals without any further
appeal to the Supreme Court.1 3
Although there is no precise precedent for such legislation, it
would seem to be constitutional. It is a matter of common knowledge that defendants in cases with racial aspects frequently do not
get fair trials in state courts in the Deep South. Therefore, there
is a need for American citizens to be assured of a fair trial in cases
involving racial implications brought in state courts in the Deep

See 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1958). See also MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S.
(1949).
0.03(39)School
JUDICIAL CODE,
Bd., 308 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1962); Sawyer

2 See, e.g., Bush v.
..
v. City of Mobile, 208 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Ala. 1961); Cobb v. Library Bd.,
207 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ala. 1961); Parks v. New York Times Co., 195
F. Supp. 919 (M.D. Ala. 1961), rev'd, 308 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 583,
aff'd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.),
aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
1"" The Supreme Court is already under an extremely heavy burden
handling appeals involving federal and constitutional questions from state
and federal courts throughout the land, and no legislation should add to that
burden unless, in the interest of justice, it is absolutely imperative to do so.
None of the federal courts of appeal have exhibited any substantial amount
of prejudice recently, and there is virtually no reason to believe that
injustice would result if they finally decided these matters. The district
courts, however, have not been as free from prejudice as the federal appellate courts; consequently, there is much more need for a right of appeal
from the district court level.
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South. If these state courts are allowed to continue denying defendants fair trials in cases with racial aspects, and such denials
are left to be corrected by expensive and time consuming appeals to
the Supreme Court, or not at all, these courts will be effectively
preventing many from receiving a fair trial, which is a right guaranteed to all persons by the fourteenth amendment; and it would
certainly seem appropriate for Congress to pass any legislation
necessary to prevent the frustration of one of the fundamental
objectives of that amendment. 174
The proposed legislation is not suggested as a panacea for unfair trials involving acute racial hostility. Even where a case is
tried in a federal district court before an absolutely fair judge,
the jury of local citizens may be unfair in making key factual findings. '5 I do believe, however, that legislation along the lines
suggested would help the situation. Essentially, it would introduce
a greater element of fairness in the current situation by permitting
the removal of cases involving racial issues and tensions to a court
system which has exhibited far less prejudice than the state courts
in the Deep South in handling these cases. In that way, such
"' Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment provides that "Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress' right to pass

legislation to give force and effect to this amendment. See EX parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879). It may be argued that the proposed legislation would permit a
defendant other than one in a case involving racial conflict to seek removal
of his case from a state to a federal court on the ground that the defendant
would not receive a fair trial in the state court, and that such applications
would place an undue burden upon the federal court system. For instance,
in states outside of the South, such as New York, Illinois, and California,
where there are substantial numbers of criminal cases, defendants in these
cases may try to effect a removal of their cases from the state courts to
the already very busy and overworked federal courts in those areas. It is
true that the proposed legislation might initially invite a large number of
applications for removal in cases having nothing to do with racial issues,
but I believe in a relatively short time the federal courts could discourage
the making of such applications except in the most deserving cases; for
there could be instances, not involving racial conflict, where the facts and
circumstances would indicate that a defendant would not be able to secure
a fair trial in state courts, and on those occasions, which I believe will be
rare, it is submitted that it should be possible to remove such litigation to
federal courts. Consequently, I think legislation of the type proposed is very
much needed and would not place too great a burden on the federal judiciary
system.
owever, such verdicts would probably be set aside more rapidly
in the federal judiciary than in the state court hierarchies of the Deep South.
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legislation would, in my opinion, contribute in substantial measure
to the solution of a current problem of injustice.
C. The Question of Jurisdiction
The question of whether the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County had jurisdiction over the Times was tenaciously contested
by that newspaper throughout the course of the entire litigation.
As previously pointed out the circuit court held that the Times
had made a general appearance in the action and, therefore, was
subject to its jurisdiction. This holding was sustained by the Alabama Supreme Court. In addition, the Alabama Supreme Court
ruled that the activities of the newspaper were more than sufficient
to meet the minimal standards required for service of process on
an agent or representative of the company and, as the advertisement in question was connected with the activities of the Times
in Alabama, the newspaper was subject to service of process under
Alabama's "long arm" statute.1 6 The Alabama appellate court
declared that the plaintiff's service of process upon Don McKee,
a "stringer" for the Times in Montgomery whom the court considered to be an agent of the company, and the plaintiff's service
pursuant to the "long arm" statute were proper and brought the
177
newspaper company within the jurisdiction of the Alabama courts.
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court did not discuss the question
of jurisdiction in its opinion although the issue was argued at length
by the Times in its brief. By failure to mention the question of
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court must have considered that the
Alabama courts had jurisdiction over the Times. However, the
opinion does not indicate whether the Supreme Court based its
conclusion on any one or more of the following grounds: that the
Times had converted a special appearance into a general one; that
it was effectively served through service on one of its agents; or
that it was subject to and was properly served by substituted
service as provided in Alabama's "long arm" statute.
Logically, it would seem the Supreme Court must have considered that The New York Times had made a general appearance.
The circuit court originally held that the Times had made a general
appearance and thereby waived any defects in the service of process.
1T0 Ala.
iT

Acts 1953, No. 282, at 347. See note 39 supra.
See 273 Ala. at 686, 144 So. 2d at 51.
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The Alabama Supreme Court sustained this finding, which meant
that the first question relating to jurisdiction that faced the Supreme
Court was whether the Times had made a general appearance. If
it agreed with this conclusion, there was no need to discuss whether
the Alabama courts had jurisdiction, since by its general appearance,
the Times had voluntarily submitted to Alabama jurisdiction. On
the other hand, if the Supreme Court concluded the Times had not
made a general appearance, then it would seem that it should
have explained precisely on what grounds the Alabama courts gained
jurisdiction over the Times. From its silence, it is logical to assume
that the Supreme Court considered that the newspaper company had
made a general appearance, thus making the other grounds upon
which the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the state courts
gained jurisdiction moot and requiring no further discussion or
explanation by the Supreme Court.
However, it cannot be concluded that the Supreme Court,
by its silence, also ratified the other rulings by the Alabama Supreme
Court on the point of jurisdiction. On the contrary, by agreeing
that the Times had made a general appearance, it is submitted that
the Supreme Court never reached the question of whether the
methods of service used by the plaintiff brought the Times under
the jurisdiction of the Alabama courts.
By failing to discuss the question of jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court has left open for future consideration an area of substantial
significance to companies operating in communications on an interstate basis. The New York Times Co. is neither an Alabama
corporation nor a corporation licensed to do business in that state,
and its activities in Alabama were negligible at the time this law
suit was instituted.1 8 Moreover, the advertisement which formed
the basis for the plaintiff's cause of action was not solicited or obtained in Alabama nor was it secured from an Alabama advertiser.
In spite of these facts, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that the
Times had sufficient contacts with the state to justify subjecting
it to jurisdiction there. In addition, the court ruled the cause of
action was so connected with the newspaper's activities in the state
as to warrant service of process on it by substituted service. The
United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the question of
"" See Record, vol 1, pp. 402, 441-45; id., vol. 2, pp. 601-02; id., vol. 5,
pp. 1942-43.
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jurisdiction in a case involving the press or other communications
media where a company's contacts with the state were nearly as
minimal as those in Sullivan. Whenever this does occur, it would
have an inhibiting effect upon those in communications if the
Supreme Court should follow the ruling of Alabama's highest
court.
Such a ruling would make it possible for companies in the
communications industry to be exposed to vexatious, abusive, and
expensive law suits in states where these companies engage in a
negligible amount of activity. Moreover, these states might be substantial distances from the home offices of the defendant companies,
and litigation in these distant forums could cause tremendous inconveniences. As a consequence of all this, these companies would
probably cease their operations in these states altogether. For
instance, there would be a tendency among newspaper publishers
not to send correspondents or use "stringers" to gather first hand
news reports in states where they did not regularly operate. They
would rely on wire services and second hand reports gathered from
local newspapers. This would bring about more uniformity in
news and opinion when greater diversity and less standardization
are more essential to the successful functioning of a democratic
society. 79

The Alabama Supreme Court based its finding that the Times'
bactivities in the state were sufficient to subject it to jurisdiction
upon the following grounds: the gathering of news by the Times
in Alabama through "stringers"' 0 and staff correspondents 181 the
intermittent solicitation of advertising in Alabama by that newspaper and its acceptance of unsolicited advertising from advertisers
located within the State ;182 and its delivery to Alabama of a small
...
The standardization of news and opinion has long been a matter of
grave concern. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) ; United States
v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1

(1945);

ERNST, FIR sT FRmDOm

93 (1946). With respect to the need for

diersity, see Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
...
A "stringer" gathers and sends news to an out-of-town newspaper or
magazine on a part-time basis. He is not considered an employee of the outof-town newspaper, and payments are made in the case of the Times on the
basis of material requested or used at the rate of one cent per word. A
"stringer" probably has other employment. Usually he works for a local
newspaper. See Record, vol. 1, pp. 136, 140-42, 153.
"8'Id, at 53-54; id., vol. 3, pp. 1140-42.
...
Id., vol. 1, pp. 54-55; id., vol. 3, p. 1142.
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number of copies of The New York Times, pursuant to unsolicited
requests by Alabama readers and news dealers.183 Put in still
more specific terms, it appears that the Times had two "stringers" in
Alabama at the time Sullivan brought suit ;184 and on occasion, it
dispatched correspondents to Alabama to cover news events there.'85
To give an idea of how much work these "stringers" did for the
Times in Alabama, payments to resident "stringers" in Alabama
during the first five months of 1960, the year the suit was commenced, totalled 245 dollars-approximately one tenth of one per
cent of the total payments to "stringers" by the Times during that
period." 6 The occasional visits of Times' correspondents to Alabama to report on news events places its correspondents in that
state with no greater frequency than they are in such far off places
as Ankara, Athens, and New Delhi.18 According to the record in
this case, 6/100ths of one per cent of the Times' daily circulation
and 2/10ths of one per cent of its Sunday circulation are in Alabama, and 46/1000ths of one per cent of its advertising revenue is
derived from that state. 8. In a word, the activities of the Times
in Alabama at the time this suit was initiated were minuscule.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has expanded and made more
flexible the standards under which a nonresident corporation may
be subjected to a state's jurisdiction. However, it is highly doubtful
whether any of these criteria sustain the Alabama Supreme Court's
conclusion that the activities of the Times in the state were "more
than amply sufficient" to meet the minimal standards required to
subject that corporation to Alabama's jurisdiction.'8 9
For a corporation to be subject to the jurisdiction of a state
in suits arising there from transactions unconnected with its
activities in that state, the corporation must engage in "continuous
corporate operations" in the state which are "so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on the causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities."' 190
Id., vol. 1, p. 55; id. at 428; id., vol. 3, pp. 1142-47.
Id., vol. 1, pp. 440-42.
...
Brief for Petitioner, p. 78, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
180 Record, vol. 1, pp. 441-42.
"8 See Brief for Petitioner, p. 78.
188 Record, vol. 1, pp. 402, 444-45.
See also Brief for Petitioner, p. 78.
180 See 273 Ala. at 669, 144 So. 2d at 33.
00 International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
See also id. at 317. Note that even certain forms of regularly recurring
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It is submitted that the negligible operations of the Times in Alabama were of such a nature as to make its relationship with that
state a distal one; and consequently, these operations did not meet
the standard of being "so substantial and of such a nature" as to
subject the Times to the jurisdiction of that state in cases arising
out of transactions completely separate from its activities in Alabama.
A nonresident corporation whose operations in a state are not
so substantial as to bring it under the rule discussed in the previous
paragraph may nonetheless be required to defend a suit in that state
where the cause of action is connected with the corporation's activities within the state.'91 However, the activities of The New York
Times in Alabama were unrelated to the cause of action sued upon
by the plaintiff, since the advertisement which formed the basis for
the suit was not placed by an Alabama advertiser nor was it solicited
or obtained in Alabama. The ad in issue had nothing to do with the
Times' activities in Alabama. Thus, the facts in the case do not
seem to support the finding that Alabama had jurisdiction over the
Times.

192

There is further reason to doubt that the Times was subject to
the jurisdiction of Alabama. The Supreme Court in International
Shoel'9 3 stated that the criteria for determining whether a nonresident corporation is subject to the jurisdiction of another state is
not
simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has
sometimes been suggested, whether the activity, which the
corporation has seen fit to procure through its agents in another
state is a little more or a little less ....

Whether due process is

activity may not justify the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident
corporation. See, e.g., Rosenberg Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516
(1923).
"' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 190, at 317, 319.
See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958); Blount v. Peerless
Chemicals (P.R.) Inc., 316 F.2d 695, 700 (2d Cir. 1963).
19.Sullivan is different from McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355

U.S. 220 (1957), which was relied on by the Alabama Supreme Court, because there the cause of action arose directly out of the defendant's activities

in California. See also Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 191, at 251-52. More-

over, McGee involved a suit on an insurance contract against a nonresident
insurer, and this contract constituted a continuing legal relationship between
the insurer and the insured within the state, a relation which the states, with
the concurrence of Congress, have long regulated. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1958).
19. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
it was the purpose of the due process clause to inlaws which
194
sure.
International Shoe also cited with approval what Judge Learned
Hand had pointed out years earlier: an "'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from trial away
from its 'home' or principal place of business is relevant ... 195 in
determining whether a nonresident corporation should be subject
to a state's jurisdiction.
Viewed against this background, the Alabama Supreme Court
ruling which would permit virtually every newspaper to be sued
in any state in which it had just a trivial circulation would be so
greatly inconvenient to publishers as to be unfair and, therefore,
would certainly not further the "fair and orderly administration of
the laws."' 6 This conclusion is buttressed in Sullivan by the fact that
the action was not initiated merely to recover damages for alleged
injury to the plaintiff's reputation, but was primarily brought to
make an example of the defendant company by imposing upon it
unreasonably harsh punitive damages.
Moreover, it would seem that the application of the "flexible
standard' '1 97 of InternationalShoe to newspapers and other communications media which are protected by the first amendment would
not only require a consideration of the due process problems present
in every jurisdiction case, but a determination of whether the
assertion of jurisdiction would impinge upon freedoms of speech
and of the press as guaranteed by the first amendment. The Alabama rule would suppress the circulation of out-of-state papers
which, like The New York Times, are sent principally as an accommodation to local readers. As these out-of-state papers would
suffer little financial loss by withdrawing from states like Alabama, they would stop shipping their papers to these states rather
1
o,Id. at 319. (Emphasis added.) (Citation omitted.)
Id. at 317, citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141
(2d Cir. 1930).
." In Sullivan the total circulation of the issue in which the advertisement
giving rise to the suit appeared was 650,000, of which approximately 394
copies went into Alabama, and about 35 of these into Montgomery County.
Record, vol. 2, pp. 601-2; id., vol. 5, pp. 1942-43.
0" The standard set in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945), was referred to as the "flexible standard" in Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
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than take the risk of being subjected to expensive lawsuits. The
result would be that the residents of such states would be deprived
of the opportunity of reading newspapers from other sectors of the
country. In addition, as previously pointed out, out-of-state papers
would hesitate to use "stringers" or correspondents in such states
as Alabama. As the Alabama rule would operate to suppress circulation and newsgathering, it would be inconsistent with the first
amendment, and this casts further doubt upon its legal soundness.
In summary, by failing to discuss the question of jurisdiction in
Sullivan, the Supreme Court left open for future consideration the
question of whether a nonresident corporation in the field of mass
communications engaged in a minuscule amount of newsgathering,
news circulation, and advertising-or other equally negligible
activities-in a state is subject to the jurisdiction of that state.
When and if this question of substantial significance should come
before the Supreme Court, it is unlikely-for the reasons stated
above-that the Court's ruling will be similar to that of the Alabama Supreme Court.'
III.

APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is a most significant decision.
For not only did the Supreme Court enunciate, for the first time,
a rule to govern "the extent to which the constitutional protections
for speech and press limit a state's power to award damages in a
libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official
conduct,"' 99 but in making this decision the Court brought considerable uniformity to the law of libel and nullified an action which
had encroached upon free speech and press "under the guise of
punishing for libel."2 '
For many years state courts have been split on whether a person
is liable for publishing a false statement about the conduct in office
of a public official when such publication is made in good faith.
By adopting the rule requiring a public official to prove "actual
malice" to recover damages for a defamatory statement relating
to his official conduct, the Supreme Court has, in effect, followed
..
8 For excellent discussions of various arguments against the Alabama

rule, see Brief for Petitioner, pp. 69-90; Brief for the Washington Post Co.
as Amicus Curiae, pp. 28-36.
199

376 U.S. at 256.

.00
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 264 (1952).
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the minority state-court view, wiped out the majority view, and
unified or nationalized this segment of the law of libel in the
United States.
There can be no doubt that the libel action in Sullivan was
instituted to punish and suppress expressions of support for the
cause of racial equality. In this case the Supreme Court actually
dealt with the problem it had anticipated in Beauharnais.0 1 It had
to exercise its authority to defeat an action which encroached "on
freedom of utterance under the guise of punishing libel."20 2
Sullivan is a landmark decision in the law of libel and in the
field of civil liberties. It represents a tremendous step forward in
these areas, but like all cases, even great ones, it solved some problems and raised or left others. There is serious question, for example, whether the Constitution affords greater protection to persons exercising the right of public criticism than the standard
adopted by the Court. Moreover, although the case was not decided
on the basis of due process, it is an excellent example of the difficulty a defendant encounters in obtaining a fair trial in state courts
in certain areas of the Deep South when racial issues are involved,
and it served as a point of departure in this article for a discussion
of the question of what, if anything, can be done to remedy that
situation. It also raised some jurisdictional questions which are
of substantial significance to communications companies operating
on an interstate basis. The Court in its wisdom, and perhaps in its
anxiety to reach the very important substantive issues in the case,
left these jurisdictional problems for future consideration. When
viewed as a whole, however, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is a
soundly reasoned decision which dealt with issues of such social
and legal magnitude as to make it of historic moment in the annals
of American law.
...
Id.at 263-64 & n.18.
02
2
Id.at 263-64.

